Abstract: China's social health insurance has expanded dramatically over the past decade. The increasing number of beneficiaries and benefits, however, has aggravated rather than mitigated regional disparities in health care. How can the regional variation in Chinese social health insurance be explained? This paper argues that the subnational variation in China's social health insurance results from central and local states' policy choices. The central leadership, which is concerned about regime stability, delegates substantial discretionary authority to local state agents to accommodate diverse social needs and local circumstances. Local officials, who care about their political careers in the centralized personnel system, proactively design and implement social health insurance policy according to local situations such as fiscal resources and social risk. In specifying the rationale, conditions and patterns of regional variation in Chinese social health insurance, this paper addresses the general issue of how political leaders in an authoritarian regime respond to social needs.
This paper argues that the regional variation in China's social health insurance results from central and local leaders' policy choices. The Chinese central leaders, whose priority is to maintain regime stability, face a trade-off between control and accommodation of local needs.
2 UEBMI is an employment-based contributory social health insurance program financed by defined contributions from employees and employers (including government). URBMI and NRCMI are residency-based social health insurance programs, financed mostly by general taxes in addition to individuals' premium payments.
When the central leaders control the career incentives of local officials, they delegate substantial discretionary power to local officials in health insurance reform to accommodate diverse social needs at the local level. With discretionary power in hand, local officials, who care about their political careers and wish to prevent social unrest from jeopardizing their political survival, design and implement social welfare policy in a way that suits local circumstances. Thus, diverse local socioeconomic conditions lead to different distributional choices in social health insurance.
Specifically, local officials in regions with high social risk tend to enlarge the risk pool of social health insurance, while local officials in regions with high fiscal revenues are likely to enhance the generosity of social health insurance. While officials in regions with favorable risk profiles and high fiscal revenues become pioneers in promoting risk-and income-redistribution through social health insurance reform experiment, their counterparts in regions with neither high social risk nor sufficient fiscal resources maintain the status quo of a fragmented and inequitable social health insurance system in their jurisdictions. In specifying the rationale, conditions and patterns of the regional variation in Chinese social health insurance, this paper addresses the more general issue of how authoritarian leaders respond to social needs in designing social policy.
The paper unfolds as follows: Section 2 discusses existing studies of Chinese social welfare. Section 3 develops a theoretical framework to elucidate the rationale, conditions, and policy results of Chinese social welfare provision, and it formulates three hypotheses for empirical test.
Section 4 presents and discusses the empirical findings and evidence. Section 5 concludes the paper with a discussion of its implications.
The Political Economy of Chinese Social Welfare: Received Wisdom
Studies of Chinese social welfare in the fields of economics, public policy and political science provide insights to understand the Chinese social welfare system from different perspectives. Scholarly work on Chinese social health insurance in the fields of health policy and economics usually takes benefits (including the number of people who receive benefits and the level of benefits that people receive) as the starting point. Several problems are commonly identified and discussed in this strand of literature: 1) a pro-rich bias, or inequity in social health insurance benefits across social groups; Although this literature has contributed to a rigorous evaluation of the socioeconomic impact of health insurance programs, the causes of those outcomes remain understudied. In the literature on Chinese political economy, some attempts were made to explore the causes of China's fragmented social welfare provision.
The dominant paradigm explaining fragmentation and piecemeal reform over the past decades of the Chinese social welfare system focuses on the transition from a planned economy to a market-oriented one.
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Marketization, especially the privatization and reconstruction of the state-owned enterprises (SOEs), is said to have led to a collapse of the "iron rice bowl" (life-time employment) and the work-unit (danwei)-based welfare system.
8
Mass labor dislocation, especially the "laid-off" (xia gang) in SOEs that caused popular discontent and a wave of "collective events" (ji ti shi jian) such as protests and street demonstrations in the 1990s, induced the establishment of a social insurance system, moving the risk pooling from individual 3 Yip 2009; Wagstaff et al. 2009a . 7 For a helpful summary of the economic paradigm, see Duckett 2012 . 8 Ho 1995 Gu 2001; Gu and Zhang 2006. enterprises to regions.
9
The state's "retreat" from social protection during the earlier stages of economic reform (before 2003) has been systematically studied 10 and criticized by scholars.
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Although the impact of the economic transition on China's social welfare system has received widespread attention, the political mechanism underlying the fragmentation of Chinese social welfare provisions is underspecified in those accounts. Duckett (2012) challenges the economic reform paradigm and shows that elite leadership and ideological changes in the late 1970s help to explain the collapse of the Rural Co-operative Medical System.
12
Her earlier work shows how bureaucratic interests within the central government have influenced the design and adoption of the UEBMI program, which provided only for the urban working population, subsidized civil servants, and was administered locally.
13
In a similar vein, William C. Hsiao attributes the pendulum in China's health reform policy between health care provision through government funding and through a regulated market to the competition of bureaucratic interests in the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, respectively.
14
Neither the economic-reform paradigm nor the bureaucratic-politics paradigm, however, can sufficiently explain the remarkable subnational variation in China's social health insurance.
Recent scholarship has shifted to local leaders-the main providers of social welfare-to understand the political economy of social welfare provision in China. Two different perspectives emerge from these works. One view focuses on local leaders' economic incentives for social welfare provision. Mark Frazier uses local leaders' zeal for accumulating social security funds in local coffers to account for the rapid establishment of local-based pension systems in urban China.15 Yanzhong Huang's research finds that rural leaders with thriving local industrial sectors value their lucrative jobs more highly than do their counterparts and thus are more likely to defer to peasants' welfare demands in order to hold their positions in the community.16 The other perspective focuses on local leaders' political incentives for social welfare provision. Xiaobo Lu. and Mingxing Liu, for example, attribute the different patterns of education spending among Chinese counties to local leaders' differential career trajectories and promotion prospects.17 In a similar vein, Taiwei Liu contends that ambitious provincial officials -those who seek to advance their careers at the central level-spend more on education and health and less on social security and welfare than their local-oriented counterparts do, because the former are more eager to impress Beijing and increase their chances for promotion.18
This paper contributes to the literature on Chinese social welfare in three aspects. First, following the recent scholarship that explores the political economy of Chinese social welfare provision at the local level, this study emphasizes various local constraints that local leaders face in designing social health insurance policy. Second, I make an effort to clearly identify and characterize the regional patterns of social health insurance in China. Although the subnational variation in Chinese social welfare provisions is not new to many scholars, the variation has not been delineated in a systematic way. Third, the study theorizes the interplay of the central and local leaders' interests and its impact on the multidimensional design of social welfare policy. for social welfare provision. Mark Frazier uses local leaders' zeal for accumulating social security funds in local coffers to account for the rapid establishment of local-based pension systems in urban China.
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Yanzhong Huang's research finds that rural leaders with thriving local industrial sectors value their lucrative jobs more highly than do their counterparts and thus are more likely to defer to peasants' welfare demands in order to hold their positions in the community.
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The other perspective focuses on local leaders' political incentives for social welfare provision. Xiaobo Lü and Mingxing Liu, for example, attribute the different patterns of education spending among Chinese counties to local leaders' differential career trajectories and promotion prospects.
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In a similar vein, Taiwei Liu contends that ambitious provincial officials -those who seek to advance their careers at the central level-spend more on education and health and less on social security and welfare than their local-oriented counterparts do, because the former are more eager to impress Beijing and increase their chances for promotion.
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This paper contributes to the literature on Chinese social welfare in three aspects. First, following the recent scholarship that explores the political economy of Chinese social welfare provision at the local level, this study emphasizes various local constraints that local leaders face in designing social health insurance policy. Second, I make an effort to clearly identify and characterize the regional patterns of social health insurance in China. Although the subnational variation in Chinese social welfare provisions is not new to many scholars, the variation has not been delineated in a systematic way. Third, the study theorizes the interplay of the central and local leaders' interests and its impact on the multidimensional design of social welfare policy. 
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Social insurance is the dominant format of social welfare provision in China.
21
The distribution of insurance benefits comprises three different dimensions: generosity, coverage, and stratification. Generosity refers to the average level of benefits among people who receive social welfare. Coverage represents the share of the population that has access to the benefits.
Stratification captures the inequality in levels of benefits that different groups receive. These three dimensions are correlated in different ways depending on the specific conditions: when the amount of social welfare benefits is fixed, broader coverage might lead to lower generosity, and vice versa.
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Moreover, these different dimensions have distinct distributive implications and outcomes. For instance, a high level of stratification of social welfare implies severe inequalities, while broad coverage implies universalism. Politicians at different levels have different policy preferences for these dimensions, depending on their interests and policy options in a specific institutional setting.
The Chinese central leaders' top priority in social welfare provision is to maintain regime stability.
23
As the threats to regime stability can come from both elites and the masses, choosing to distribute rents and goods only to the elites or only to the masses is not an optimal strategy from the authoritarian leaders' perspective.
24
Instead, authoritarian leaders try to efficiently balance the benefits between elites and the masses so as to maximize their survival prospects.
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Of special importance for the political survival of the Chinese authoritarian regime is to maintain particularly privileged welfare provisions for the elites, while preserving an essentially modest social provision for the masses. To achieve this, the central leaders face a trade-off between control and accommodation of social needs. On one hand, they attempt to control who gets what, distributing more benefits to the social groups with the most political connections or importance for regime stability. The center's control of the stratification patterns of social welfare works through three mechanisms: social legislation, fiscal transfers, and personnel management. Since the 1990s, through a series of legislation and statutes, the central leadership has established a social health insurance system in which social groups are entitled to different programs with distinct levels of benefits depending on their socioeconomic status.
26
This fragmented social welfare system is conducive to weakening social groups' capabilities for horizontal mobilization 27 while privileging the groups with political connections or importance to the regime. Moreover, the center allocates huge transfer payments to subsidize the health insurance for the privileged groups such as party officials, civil servants, and concentrated ethnic minority groups, assuring that they receive higher levels of benefits.
28
Furthermore, through extensive and centralized personnel control, the center makes local state agents internalize its political priority -maintaining social order-in social policy making and implementation.
29
On the other hand, the central leaders want to accommodate most social groups to some extent, avoiding too much of a gap between the haves and have-nots. Since the central leaders have higher information costs and less expertise to distribute benefits among various social groups in a way that maximizes political returns under changing and diverse subnational circumstances, they need to delegate discretionary power to local state agents in making and implementing social welfare policy; the center can do this precisely because it controls the career incentives of local state agents and can control the stratification of social welfare provisions through the aforementioned tools (e.g. social legislation and fiscal transfer). Thus, through various administrative regulations, 30 the center has granted substantial discretion to local officials in specifying the policy details that directly determine the coverage and generosity of social health insurance, such as eligibility requirements, pooling units (e.g. county, city, or province), reimbursement rates, contribution rates, and conditions for premium exemption.
Chinese local leaders are appointed by the center, and they care about their political careers in the established system. In order to advance their careers, they have to meet a variety of policy targets set by the center. Aside from maintaining social stability in their jurisdiction, economic development and public goods provision are also the main responsibilities assigned to local officials. In social welfare policy-making, local officials face various constraints: political, fiscal and social. First, local officials' policy choices are constrained by the political principles set by the center. On the surface, Chinese local officials manage the majority of the social insurance funds and responsibilities over social welfare provisions, 31 which significantly enhances their power through larger budgets, more personnel slots and greater regulatory power. Nevertheless, the performance of local officials is monitored by the center through top-down personnel control.
In addition, local leaders have to abide by the Social Insurance Law that specifically stipulates the fragmentation and stratification patterns of social insurance.
32
The second constraint that local officials face in social welfare provision is fiscal stringency. Under China's fiscal decentralization or de facto "fiscal federalism", 32 According to the Social Insurance Law promulgated in 2010, social insurance should be pooled at (or above) the county or prefectural city level; within each of the pooling units (e.g. county, district or city), social insurance is divided into at least three schemes corresponding to different levels of benefits: urban employee scheme, urban resident scheme, and rural resident scheme. 33 On the partially federal characteristics of China, see Weingast 1995. main providers and sponsors of social welfare: they bear about 70 per cent of the social health insurance financing for the non-working population, including peasants, the elderly, students and children. Some local governments have faced substantial budget deficits 34 so paying the medical bills in full and on time is a burden on local budgets for these localities. Thus, local fiscal revenue is an important predictor of local officials' policy choice regarding the generosity of social health insurance. Importantly, the degree of fiscal constraints on social welfare provision differs across regions depending on local fiscal resources, including fiscal revenue extracted from local sources and fiscal transfers received from the center.
The third constraint that local officials face is social risk.
35
Social risk is a crucial factor shaping local officials' policy choice on health coverage for three reasons. First, the nature of social health insurance is pooling and sharing risk across segments of the population. The performance of social health insurance is thus contingent on the demographic or risk profile of localities. A region with a younger population will face lower risk, for example, than a region with an aging population. Second, the lack of a nationwide risk pooling and redistribution mechanism in China's social health insurance system makes the regions with small populations particularly vulnerable to exogenous shocks such as disease epidemics and natural disasters.
Third and most importantly, decades of mass migration accompanying economic reform and openness have profoundly changed the risk profiles of some regions. Deng Xiaoping's strategy for economic reform and openness in the 1980s "let some people (regions) get rich first" starting 34 Oi and Zhao 2007; Wong 2009. 35 Here "social risk" is used as a compound of different risks that are covered by or related to social health insurance. For example, localities with a more dependent population (such as elderly and children) have higher health risks than others do. Localities with larger labor-intensive manufacturing sectors have higher risks of workplace injury and sickness than others do. Many scholars of comparative social welfare have argued that social policy responds to demographic and labor market shifts. See, among others, Peng and Wong 2008; Torben 2001; Esping-Andersen 1999. from the "special economic zones," creating a domestic labor market in which some inland regions continuously "export" labor to the coastal regions. Labor mobility works as a multiplier of social risk, creating strong preferences for local officials in these regions to enlarge the risk pooling of social health insurance.
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In summary, the Chinese central leadership incorporates elements of both control and accommodation in social welfare provision in order to maintain regime stability. On one hand, the center relies on social legislation, fiscal transfers and personal management to maintain a fragmented and stratified social welfare system that ultimately weakens social groups' capabilities for horizontal mobilization while privileging certain groups over others. On the other, the center delegates discretionary power to local officials in policy design regarding the coverage and generosity of social insurance, in order to accommodate diverse local situations.
Local officials who want to survive under the top-down evaluation system attempt to prevent social unrest from breaking out in their jurisdiction by proactively designing and providing social welfare benefits in a manner that suits the local conditions and social needs of their constituents.
Since local officials' discretion in social welfare policy lies mainly on the dimensions of coverage and generosity, they have four different choices in distributing social insurance benefits: 1) a generous and inclusive model (i.e. giving more people more benefits), 2) a generous yet exclusive model (i.e. giving certain groups more benefits), 3) a strict yet inclusive model (i.e. giving more people benefits but with meager provisions), and 4) a strict and exclusive model (i.e. giving certain groups benefits with meager provisions). The model that local officials 36 This mechanism is the same for labor-inflowing and -outflowing regions. It seems more obvious in labor-outflow regions, where mass labor outflows exacerbate population aging and place burdensome payment pressures on local social health insurance funds. The risk-magnifying mechanism applies to labor-inflow regions too, because the regions receiving mass labor inflows are heavily reliant on laborintensive manufacturing and service sectors. With potentially high needs of medical service and threats of large labor outflows, local officials in the labor-inflow regions prefer expansive risk-pooling for social insurance to counter the increased social risk.
choose is determined by the configuration of constraints they face, particularly in terms of fiscal resources and social risk in their jurisdictions.
Several empirical implications can be derived from the theoretical analysis. First, the local distribution of social health insurance benefits will differ importantly along the dimensions of generosity and coverage where the center delegates substantial authority to local officials.
Second, the generosity and coverage of social health insurance will vary with the fiscal and socioeconomic conditions that constrain local officials' policy choices. Based on these implications, the following hypotheses are formulated for empirical test. 
Subnational Variation in Chinese Social Health Insurance: Empirical Analysis
The central goal of this section is to empirically elucidate: 1) the regional patterns of China's social health insurance in terms of coverage and generosity; 2) the relations between local socioeconomic conditions and regional patterns of social health insurance; and 3) the mechanism through which local socioeconomic conditions influence distributional patterns of social health insurance benefits (in terms of shaping local officials' policy choices under the framework set by the center). Before proceeding further with the empirical analysis, this section first discusses the data and empirical strategy to be used. In China, all local governments (including provinces, prefectures and counties) manage certain social health insurance programs.
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The province is selected as the unit of analysis for the quantitative component of this study for two reasons. First, so far all available Chinese social health insurance statistics are reported at the national or provincial levels. The merit of these statistics is that they cover all provinces and time periods from 1999, when social health insurance was established in China. The drawback, however, is that the statistics are too aggregated to conduct intra-province analysis. Considering these limitations, I use province as the unit of quantitative analysis while complementing it with qualitative evidence drawing from field interviews at other local levels (e.g. prefecture and county). Second, for analytical simplicity, the theoretical analysis assumes that the Chinese political structure consists of two levels-the central and the local-and that the logic underlying the interaction between the central and local levels is portable to the relationship between upper and lower levels among local governments. Hence, using province as the unit of quantitative analysis does not undermine the theory, but its limits should be kept in mind when interpreting the quantitative results and the empirical implications.
To test the hypotheses, I constructed a provincial-level panel dataset (1999-2010) using statistics compiled from various sources. The empirical strategy consisted of employing cluster analyses to identify and characterize the regional patterns of social health insurance; I then conduct statistical analysis to evaluate the relations between local socioeconomic conditions and social health insurance. As a final step, I complement the quantitative analysis with qualitative evidence drawing upon 140 field interviews to illustrate how local officials make policy choices regarding health coverage and generosity according to local socioeconomic conditions. 37 Chinese social health insurance programs can be considered as consisting of two types: urban and rural. Urban health insurance that mainly consists of UEBMI and URBMI is pooled at the prefectural or provincial levels and managed by the local governments of the respective level; rural health insurance, which mainly refers to the NRCMS, is pooled at the county or prefectural levels and managed by respective the county or prefectural governments. the results (see Table 1 ) indicate four significantly distinct clusters among Chinese provinces in terms of generosity and coverage of social health insurance. Table 2 reports the province members of each cluster and their ranks on generosity and coverage. Computing the cluster average ranks on these two indicators makes the features of each cluster readily apparent: cluster 2 and cluster 4 are starkly distinct from one 38 Cluster analysis is a quantitative method that classifies objects into relatively homogenous groups. The objective is to group n units into r clusters where r is much smaller than n. Each group identified by cluster analysis is as internally homogenous as possible, but as distinct as possible from all other groups. For more details of this method, see Lewis-Beck, Bryman and Liao 2004 . For examples of using this method in the comparative social welfare studies, see Rudra 2007; Gough 2001; Ragin 1994. 39 They are compiled from China Human Resource and Social Security Yearbooks (2007-2010) and China Health Statistics Yearbooks (2007 Yearbooks ( -2010 . As the data for rural health insurance expenditure are missing in China Health Statistics Yearbooks, the generosity variable in the empirical studies of this paper pertains to urban social health insurance only. 40 These are the most recent years on which social health insurance data are completely available as of 2013.
41 There are many procedures (or "stopping rules") to determine the number of clusters in a dataset. Milligan and Cooper have conducted a well-known study to distinguish between the many stopping rules and assess which criteria provide the most valid test for the existence of a cluster. Their experiment suggests that the Duda and Hart procedure performs best in determining stopping rules. See Milligan and Cooper 1985; Duda and Hart 1973; Tidmore and Turner 1983. another, as provinces in cluster 2 clearly privilege generosity over coverage, all of them having high ranks on generosity but low ranks on population coverage. Provinces in cluster 4 are just the opposite. Moreover, provinces in cluster 1 appear to favor both coverage and generosity, as they rank relatively high on both. In contrast, provinces in cluster 3 have low values on both generosity and coverage. Based on the characteristics of these clusters, provinces in cluster 2 are referred as the privileged type, because they place an emphasis on health generosity. Provinces in cluster 4 are labeled the risk-pooling type, as they prioritize broader coverage over generosity in social health insurance. Since provinces in cluster 1 favor both generosity and coverage in social health insurance, they are referred as dual type. By contrast, average generosity and coverage are both relatively low for provinces in cluster 3, and hence cluster 3 is called the status-quo type.
The cluster analysis results also suggest that the regional patterns of social health insurance correspond to regional socioeconomic differences. The northern and northeast provinces are predominantly of the status-quo type. Their counterparts in the east coastal areas are mainly of the dual type. The populous provinces along the Yangtze River such as Sichuan, Hunan, Hubei, Jiangxi, and Anhui are of the risk-pooling type. Meanwhile, the large cities like Beijing, Shanghai, and the ethnic minority autonomous regions are of the privileged-type. Overall, the results from the cluster analysis support the first hypothesis that systematic patterns exist in Chinese social health insurance. Moreover, the clustering of Chinese provinces in social health insurance appears to correspond to regional socioeconomic differences. The next subsection turns to a more rigorous examination of the correlations between local socioeconomic conditions and the distributional attributes (e.g. coverage, generosity) of social health insurance.
Statistical Analysis: Social Health Insurance and Local Socioeconomic Conditions
The coverage and generosity variables continue to be used as dependent variables in the regression analysis that follows. The explanatory variables are level of local social risk and fiscal resources. Two factors are used as proxies of social risk: 1) labor mobility, measured by the ratio of migrants to total local population. The measure of migrants, defined as the absolute value of the difference between provincial total population and local population (i.e. population with local hukou), focuses on the magnitude of province-to-province migration; The BINT variable controls for local leaders' personal ambitions in politics; 4) unobserved year-or region-specific situations, using year and province dummies. Summary statistics of all variables are presented in Table 3 .
42 Such a measure does not take intra-province migration into account. Hence, it is a "conservative" approximation of migration for a province.
43 Province is assigned a value from 1 to 4, depending on the applicability of a set of criteria. A value of 4 indicates a provincial governor who holds a provincial post while also serving in a central government position; a value of 3 refers to a provincial official with significant past service in central ministries; a value of 2 means a provincial official with significant service in other provinces; and a value of 1 suggests a provincial official with significant service in that province. The notion of BINT and its coding were first used in Huang 1996. It was further used in Sheng 2010. The data for coding this variable are provincial governors' resumes, collected from Zheng Tan Wang (http://www.zt360.cn/jgzyjl/ljjl/), a government-sponsored media in Guangdong.
The data cover 31 Chinese mainland provinces from 1999 to 2010 to take advantage of the large cross-provincial variation in social health insurance and local socioeconomic conditions.
Since the data are constructed as a panel dataset, panel-corrected standard errors are applied in the analysis.
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The regression results are reported in Table 4 Overall, the regression results lend support to the main theoretical predictions. The first primary finding is that social risk (measured by labor mobility and the dependency ratio) is significantly and positively associated with health coverage. According to Model 2, all else constant, moving from minimal to maximal labor mobility increases coverage by nearly 30 percentage points; according to Model 3, likewise, the dependency ratio increases coverage by 19 percentage points. In the FE model (Model 2), the coefficient for labor mobility is larger and more significant than the coefficient for the dependency ratio, indicating that once we control for unobserved year-or province-specific situations, labor mobility better captures the effect of social risk on coverage. By contrast, in the LDV model (Model 3), in which we control for a province's previous level of health coverage, the dependency ratio better captures the effect of social risk on coverage. In addition, health generosity is positively correlated with labor mobility and dependency ratio in the FE and LDV models, respectively.
The second primary finding is that fiscal resources are significantly and positively associated with the generosity of social health insurance. According to Models 2 and 3, all else constant, moving from minimal to maximal fiscal resources increases health generosity per beneficiary by 681 yuan and 607 yuan, respectively. These correlations are significant at the 99 per cent confidence level in all model specifications. In addition, the regression results indicate positive correlations between fiscal resources and social health insurance coverage. However, the positive relationship loses statistical significance in the LDV model, indicating that given a province's previous level of health coverage, fiscal resources are no longer predictive of the coverage.
As for the control variables, urbanization is significantly and negatively correlated with health coverage but is positively correlated with health generosity. These quantitative results are in line with the recent observation that despite continuously increasing number of Chinese living in cities (i.e. the high urbanization rate), due to the rigid household registration system and its anachronistic associations with social entitlements, only a portion of the urban residents (usually those with state-sector employment and local urban hukou) have full access to urban social health insurance, which has markedly higher generosity than rural health insurance.
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Furthermore, BINT-the measure of provincial governors' prior career trajectories-has no significant impact on social health insurance. By contrast, economic development is significantly and positively associated with health coverage and generosity. In addition, the 47"The Rural-Urban Divide: Ending Apartheid" 2014.
unobserved year-and region-specific situations (the year and province dummies) account for about 50 per cent of the variation in health coverage and 25 per cent in health generosity.
In summary, the statistical results indicate significant correlations between local socioeconomic conditions and the distributional attributes of social health insurance (coverage and generosity). All other things being equal, regions with higher social risk tend to cover more people in health insurance, while regions with more fiscal resources tend to provide more generous health insurance benefits. The next subsection uses qualitative evidence to illustrate the underlying mechanism-how socioeconomic conditions, particularly labor mobility and fiscal resources, shape local officials' policy choices and thus give rise to the different regional patterns in Chinese social health insurance.
Evidence from Fieldwork Research: Local Choices in Social Health Insurance Reform
Complementing the statistical analysis, I conducted more than 100 interviews in 16 Chinese regions over the last three years to understand the mechanism underlying local policy choices in social health insurance reform. The fieldwork sites cover the four different types of regions, and interviewees include government officials and health insurance administrators at both the national and local levels. The findings suggest that local officials' priorities and policy choices in social health insurance reform vary markedly with local socioeconomic conditions, as the above theoretical analysis proposed. This subsection discusses the supporting evidence collected from the interviews.
Most local initiatives to expand social health insurance coverage are found in the inland provinces along the Yangtze River such as Sichuan, Hunan, Hubei and Anhui. In interviews, local officials in these regions often reveal strong concerns about existing or looming deficits in local health insurance funds. These concerns are derived from the outflow of millions of labor that these regions have witnessed in recent decades. According to China's national population census data (Table 5) , Henan, Sichuan, Hunan, and Anhui are the provinces with the largest labor outflows. Mass outflows of young labor exerts tremendous pressures on local social health insurance funds because those who stay, especially in the rural areas, are mainly the elderly and children who are more likely to need health care.
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As an administrator of social health insurance in the Zhengzhou city of Henan province put it, "Failure or delay in payments will give rise to public grievances and risk collective protests. No local officials dare to take those risks."
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This concern drives local officials in these regions to prioritize expansion of social health insurance coverage to obtain a large risk pool for social health insurance funds. Every year those officials utilize propaganda and social media such as microblogs and mobile text message to remind people-especially young people-to join the social health insurance program.
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On occasion, the requirement of local household registration (hukou) is artificially blurred or ignored in order to obtain higher enrollment. the money in their returning migrants' personal health insurance saving accounts that had been opened in the coastal provinces when they were working there.
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In expanding the coverage of social health insurance, local officials in the inland regions hold conservative and sometimes averse views towards raising the generosity.
53
This constitutes a stark contrast with the policy preferences in the coastal regions such as Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Guangdong and Shandong, where the generosity of social health insurance has increased as coverage expands. For example, the local government in Dongguan, a prefectural city in Guangdong province, has since 2008 been generously subsidizing not only the local population but also "outsiders", such as rural-to-urban migrants and peasant workers, to join local social health insurance. As for the remarkable generosity, Dongguan officials explained that "we receive nothing from the center for social health insurance, but the prosperous local economy is absolutely sufficient to support it [local social health insurance]". Like their counterparts in the coastal regions, local officials in the "privileged" regions such as Xinjiang, Ningxia, Beijing, Tianjin and Shanghai, which receive either abundant fiscal transfers or political favors from the center, are pioneers in raising the generosity of social health insurance. Nonetheless, the generous health insurance benefits in the privileged regions are exclusive and delimited to only certain groups such as party officials, civil servants, formal statesector employees, or in general, people with local urban hukou. During field interviews, I found that local social health insurance administrators in the privileged regions relentlessly stress local hukou as a crucial prerequisite for entitlement to social welfare benefits, a stark contrast to the loose enforcement of the local hukou requirement in social health insurance enrollment in the inland regions like Hubei and Hunan. The lack of incentives to expand health coverage is quite apparent in the privileged regions due to low or restricted labor mobility. Moreover, the heavy weight of the center's fiscal transfer in financing social health insurance in the ethnic minority regions further impedes local incentives to broaden the coverage.
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As a social insurance official in Ningxia province put it frankly, "we receive a lot of fiscal transfer from the center, and we want to use that money only on the designated groups."
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In the "status-quo" regions such as Guangxi and Heilongjiang, my fieldwork found that under-spending on social welfare was quite common. These provinces have not experienced the mass migration in the past decades that magnified local social risk and drove local officials to enlarge the risk pooling strategically. Moreover, unlike the privileged provinces, which usually receive fiscal or political favors from the center, these provinces with meager local revenues receive only moderate fiscal transfers from the center, which prevents them from overspending 56 It is estimated that 60%-70% of government subsidies to URBMI and NRCMI programs in Ningxia province come from the central government.
57 Interview with provincial official, Yinchuan, 24 April 2012. in social welfare. During interviews in these two provinces, fiscal straits were often cited as a reason for which local officials in these regions took "no actions" (wu zuowei, 无作为) in social health insurance reform. As one municipal official in Nanning city of Guangxi province pointed out, "some of our local governments cannot even pay their staff's salaries on time, let alone providing generous social health insurance benefits [to people]."
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For local officials in the regions with low labor mobility and with dire fiscal straits, maintaining the "status quo" of the strict and exclusive social health insurance is a less costly policy choice.
Conclusion
Despite the increasing scholarly interest in Chinese social welfare, our understanding of the political economy underpinning the distributional patterns of Chinese social welfare benefits has remained preliminary. This paper attempts to contribute to the literature by offering a political economy explanation for the regional variation in Chinese social health insurance. careers. Therefore, the local profile of social health insurance differs in generosity and coverage, the two dimensions in which the center delegates discretionary authority to local officials.
Differences across provinces in health generosity and coverage reflect the diverse local socioeconomic conditions, particularly local fiscal resources and social risk. This paper utilizes a provincial-level panel dataset (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) to identify the regional patterns of Chinese social health insurance and their correlations with local socioeconomic conditions; it also provides qualitative evidence drawing from 140 field interviews to understand the underlying political economy mechanism.
In specifying the rationale, conditions and patterns of the subnational variation in Chinese social welfare provision, the study addresses a more general issue: how political leaders in an authoritarian regime respond to diverse social needs. This paper suggests that a rationale for widespread social welfare provision exists outside of democracies. In non-democracies, politicians' incentive to provide social welfare benefits is different: it originates primarily from the top-the national leaders' interest in maintaining regime stability-rather than from the bottom as in democracies. Moreover, as this study demonstrates, the role and influence of subnational politicians in authoritarian social welfare provision are interesting and important. Notes:
1. Je (1) is the squared errors when one cluster exists and Je (2) is the sum of squared errors within a cluster when the data are broken into two clusters. 2. The conventional rule for deciding the number of groups is to determine the largest Je(2)/Je (1) value that corresponds to a low pseudo-T-squared value that has a higher T-squared value above and below it.
Notes: the cluster analysis results are calculated using cluster linkage command in STATA/IC 12.0 for Windows. Ward's linkage is used as the agglomerative linkage method in this cluster analysis. The stopping rule is Duda/Hart Je(2)/Je(1) index stopping rule. Ranks are rounded to the nearest integer to facilitate comparability. 
